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 The paper discusses implications of prevailing low interest rates on discounted 
cash flow valuations. Applying the traditional theoretical framework can lead 
to absurd results for intrinsic value. I find evidence that investment banks use 
artificially high numbers for risk-free rates and equity premia to boost weighted 
average cost of capital. I argue that valuations that are solely based on 
discounted cash flows lack meaningfulness in the current environment. They 
need to be accompanied by other techniques such as multiple valuations. In Lisa 
and mine valuation of Wacker Neuson SE we did not only “sanity-check” the 
DCF price target but used an equally weighted blended price target of DCF and 
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Low risk-free rates and their implications for valuation 
 
The cost of capital is one of the most important numbers in corporate finance and the investment 
world. Correctly applied, it helps managers to decide which projects to pick and it helps 
investors to buy the right stocks (Miller & Modigliani, 1958). While the general theoretical 
framework is basically agreed on in the academic and practitioner world, different design 
choices seem to be applied by users which can influence the outcome. We experienced first-
hand, that inputs are not always as obvious as they seem to be. More important, within our 
sensitivity analysis for our discounted cash flow model, we recognized how sensitive the 
enterprise value is for changes in the cost of capital when using the Continuing Value formula 
by McKinsey (McKinsey, Koller, Wessels, Goedhart, 2015).  
Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis on DCF valuation of Wacker Neuson SE 
 
Values in EUR, as of 2nd January 2020, Valuation performed by Lukas Müller & Lisa Preußler 
Recapping quickly, the cost of capital represents the weighted costs that a company needs to 
pay to its owners and debtors to compensate them for giving capital to the company. 
Economically, it is the opportunity cost for investors that need to forego other projects with 
similar risk/return metrics in order to pick the one at hand. Pratt and Grabowski (2014) state 
that it needs to equal the return that could have been earned on an alternative investment at a 
specific level of risk. A company has two major sources of capital, debt and equity. The 
generalized formula for the weighted cost of capital follows as (Ross, Jordan, Westerfield, & 








1468 4,3% 4,8% 5,3% 5,8% 6,3%
2,4% 35,6 26,3 20,3 16,0 12,8
2,6% 38,1 27,3 20,6 16,0 12,6
2,9% 41,5 28,5 20,9 16,0 12,4
3,1% 46,3 30,1 21,4 15,9 12,2
3,4% 53,7 32,2 21,9 15,8 11,9
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with E being the market value of equity, D being the market value of debt, 𝑟+ being the cost of 
equity, 𝑟, being the cost of debt and t representing the tax rate. As the WACC is equivalent to 
the discount rate in the discounted cash flow model, minimizing WACC maximizes value, 
ceteris paribus. The cost of equity can be found by applying following formula: 
𝑟+ = 𝑟2 + 𝛽 ∗ (𝑟4 − 𝑟2) 
with 𝑟2 being the risk-free rate, 𝛽 the sensitivity of the equity value to changes in a broad 
portfolio of investments and 𝑟4 the return of a market portfolio that consists of all available 
investment opportunities. Conceptually, the cost of debt is captured by:  
𝑟, = 	 𝑟2 + 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡	𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 
where the credit spread reflects the required compensation of a specific project or company 
above the risk-free rate.  
It becomes clear that the risk-free rate is an integral part of both equations and with that of the 
overall WACC. When comparing the forecasts of the operations of Wacker Neuson with 
consensus data from Bloomberg, we realized that our estimates were below the average analyst 
estimates. However, we still arrived at a DCF based price target above some other analyst’s 
price targets. We wondered how that is possible and quickly came to the conclusion that our 
WACC has to be below that of other analysts. To check, whether our suspicion is correct, I 
checked the last 10 published research reports by two of the biggest equity research providers 
for German small and mid-caps: Berenberg and Warburg Research.1 The following table shows 
the result compared with market rates observed at the time of writing.  
 
 
1 The author worked as an intern at Berenberg and has access to the Equity Research platform. For Warburg’s 
report I looked at mandated research that is published on the company’s homepage. 
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Table 2: Input Overview Competition 
 
The numbers used by the analysts are at odds with market rates and with academia. For our 
valuation, we opted already for 5-year averages of risk-free rates to arrive at our risk-free rate. 
However, Professor Filipa Frade de Castro2 indicated that one- or three-month rates would be 
the most appropriate approximation of risk-free rates. Applying the 3-month yield on German 
bunds3 of -0.68% in our DCF valuation yields a fair value per share of EUR 68.0 versus a 
current price of EUR 17.294. We rejected this price target as unrealistic.  Bernstein Research, 
one of the most renowned research provider for the US5, has published a note in 2016 that DCF 
models do not work in a world with near-zero or even below zero risk-free rates.6 They argue 
that this trend shifts too much weight to terminal values where forecasting errors that naturally 
occur when estimating the future 10 years out, are magnified by low discount rates. What 
analysts at Warburg and Berenberg and probably many other investment banks do is just using 
higher risk-free rates than currently observed by markets and using very high equity risk premia 
that push up the cost of equity and the WACC. This leaves me with two questions: Do models 
 
2 In her forum answer to: “Negative risk free rate”, from 31st October, 2019 (opened at 02/01/20) 
3 https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/bond/tmbmbde-03m?countrycode=bx (opened at 02/01/20) 
4 Bloomberg, Opening Quote of 2nd January, 2020 





Provider Company Date Risk-free Equity Risk Premium 3m German Bund 10y German Bund
Berenberg KPS AG 19.09.19 1.0% 7.0% -0,65% -0,51%
Berenberg technotrans 22.08.19 1.0% 7.0% -0,70% -0,65%
Berenberg Stemmer 27.06.19 1.0% 7.0% -0,54% -0,32%
Berenberg 1&1 08.05.19 1.5% 6.5% -0,56% -0,05%
Berenberg Cyan 03.05.19 1.0% 7.0% -0,54% 0,02%
Warburg Research PNE Wind 02.10.19 1.5% 7.0% -0,59% -0,55%
Warburg Research KTM Industries 20.06.19 1.5% 7.0% -0,54% -0,32%
Warburg Research Freenet 04.07.19 1.5% 7.0% -0,56% -0,40%
Warburg Research Axel Springer 24.04.19 1.5% 7.0% -0,55% -0,01%
Warburg Research Jungheinrich 11.04.19 1.5% 7.0% -0,54% -0,01%
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really break down with below zero rates and what does this behavior by market participants 
mean for investors (and analysts like us) trying to value stocks based on a DCF model? 
Lowering WACC and keeping all other inputs equal has heavy impact on the value of an asset 
which is shown in Table 1. Technically, the model does only work as long as growth is smaller 
than WACC, logically, the model will already produce unrealistic outcomes when the 
difference of those numbers becomes too narrow as terminal values skyrocket. However, one 
can argue that risk-free rates and their implications for WACC cannot be analyzed in isolation. 
Below zero interest rates for German debt are a result of stubbornly low inflation and economic 
growth in Europe. The persistence of low interest rates and the flatness of the yield curve are 
example for investor’s expectations that we will see low growth and inflation for longer. These 
circumstances will limit the company’s long-term growth rate as this rate will eventually 
correlate closely with overall growth in the economy. For us, this means that we need to care 
deeply about the long-term growth rate of the business and understand where its limits are. Our 
considerations are reflected in the 2.9% terminal growth rate that takes into account rather slow 
growing economies like Europe and more dynamic economies like USA and China where a lot 
of future growth of the company will be generated. At these levels, we feel confident that our 
expectations and the cost of capital are inherently consistent and produce a reasonable estimate 
of the fair value of the company. 
The answer to the second question is even more difficult to find. Even though, we trust our 
model and its result, it remains doubtful whether we should act on it. From Table 2 we have 
concluded that some market participants seem not to act in harmony with financial theory. This 
means, that even if all our estimates turn out to be correct (close to impossible), our price target 
might not be reached because all other market participants agreed on demanding higher 
compensation for providing capital to Wacker and with that are willing to pay less per share 
than our defined value. In consequence, we opted for a dual-method approach that mitigates 
Lukas Müller, 33843 Individual Report 03.01.2020 
potential problems with DCF-based valuations in the current market environment. Standalone 
DCFs lack meaningfulness but accompanied by relative valuations we think they do add value 
to an overall valuation. We believe that this approach is currently the most robust one as 
standalone relative valuation cannot provide enough detail about how the business is 
developing versus its peers in the future.  
 
In general, I note that the implications of negative risk-free rates and comparably low WACCs 
are not discussed in academia7. While the timeframe for studies is still short8, one can look at 
how capital asset pricing models performed in forecasting stock returns in Japan where low 
interest rates have been reality for many more years. For asset manager, and stock pickers 
especially, those studies could provide enormous inside on the question if their selection 
process is still appropriate. For capital allocators within companies, it could provide a better 
guidance for capital budgeting since they are at risk to forego a lot of value-creating projects 
when applying a too high hurdle rate.  
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